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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PRETRIAL RELEASE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: HOW
STATES HANDLE THE NOTORIOUSLY PRIVATE CRIME
ABSTRACT
Domestic violence has plagued society for years. However, until 1994,
domestic violence was not federally criminalized. Today, domestic violence
affects over ten million Americans per year. Because of the criminal justice
system’s slow reaction to domestic violence, how the criminal justice system
handles domestic violence cases is far from ideal. Pretrial release in domestic
violence cases is one area of domestic violence that is ripe for research,
guidance, and change. Pretrial release brings to light a unique balance;
defendants are presumed to be innocent, but at the same time, the fact of arrest
may point to an ongoing risk of harm to victims if defendants are released pretrial. With little known about which pretrial conditions are successful in nondomestic violence cases, the answer of how to strike the necessary balance is
even more challenging. This Note examines the different approaches states use
to assign pretrial release conditions to domestic-violence defendants who are
granted pretrial release and proposes a model statute to address—and
effectively account for—the risk of re-abuse and the rights of criminal
defendants in pretrial release.
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INTRODUCTION
In a single year, more than ten million adults experience domestic violence
(“DV”) in the United States. 1 Assuming each of those ten million adults has only
one such experience in that year, an incident of DV occurs every three seconds. 2
Yet, because domestic abusers tend to repeat the violence, these horrifying
numbers likely downplay the true extent of the problem. 3 The criminal justice
system has been relatively slow in addressing the problem and is only now
waking up to the real harms of DV. Now that the criminal justice system is taking
an active role in what was historically thought of as a private matter, more
individuals are arrested for DV. Once an arrest is made, states are forced to
confront a reoccurring issue of what to do with those charged with DV before
trial. The defendant may be held in pretrial detention or released with conditions.
Pretrial release brings to light a unique balance; defendants are presumed to be
innocent, but at the same time, the fact of arrest may point to an ongoing risk of
harm to victims if defendants are released. States have taken a less-than-uniform
approach on how to strike this balance. This Note examines the different
approaches states use to assign conditions to DV defendants who are granted
pretrial release and proposes a model statute to address—and effectively account
for—the risk of re-abuse and the rights of criminal defendants in pretrial release.
Part I of this Note will give a brief historical background of DV and how the
history has led to our current pretrial release system for DV cases. Part II will
discuss the difficulties in assigning pretrial release conditions. Further, it will
assess the balance a judge has to strike in protecting a victim while also
respecting a defendant’s constitutional rights. Part III will examine how states
currently attempt to strike that balance. States employ a variety of pretrial release
statutes. Some states rely on mandatory conditions while others use
discretionary conditions. Part IV analyzes the empirical success and legal
challenges of pretrial release conditions in DV. Taking into consideration the
statistical and legal success of the conditions, a proposed model statute to
address pretrial release in DV cases is given. The recommended model statute
will allow for the best protection for victims, lowest rates of recidivism, and
highest rate of appearance for the defendants.

1. Domestic Violence, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2020), https://assets
.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence-2020080709350855.pdf?1596828650457.
2. Id.
3. Id.; NAT’L INST. OF JUST., PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS, AND JUDGES 5 (2009), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf [hereinafter PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS].
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I. THE DARK HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES &
HOW IT INFORMS OUR VIEW OF VICTIMS’ INTERESTS
Historically, DV was handled as a private matter. 4 This school of thought
stemmed from the idea of romantic paternalism; men were the protectors of the
home and family while women were to remain the domestic caretakers. 5 Men
were considered the head of the household and maintained it through control. 6
Judge Powhattan Ellis of the Mississippi Supreme Court illustrated the thenwidespread position on DV:
Family broils and dissentions cannot be investigated before tribunals of the
country, without casting a shade over the character of those who are
unfortunately engaged in the controversy. To screen from public reproach those
who may be thus unhappily situated, let the husband be permitted to exercise the
right to moderate chastisement, in cases of great emergency, and use salutary
restraints in every case of misbehavior, without being subjected to vexatious
prosecutions, resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all parties
concerned. 7

Unsurprisingly, many women fought tirelessly against these antiquated ideals
inspiring several states to enact legislation criminalizing DV. 8 Congress
furthered this progress by federally criminalizing DV through the passage of the
Violence Against Women Act in 1994. 9
Even with more resources available to victims, local law enforcement
remained hesitant to interfere with these matters. 10 Private citizens were even
suing law enforcement for not getting involved in private matters within the
home. 11 The hesitancy to interfere, however, is slowly dissipating due to policies
such as mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution. 12 Mandatory arrest policies
require police to arrest a suspect if there is probable cause the suspect committed

4. Suraji R. Wagage, When Consequences are Life and Death: Pretrial Detention for
Domestic Violence Offenders, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 195, 203 (2014).
5. Jennifer L. Brinkley, The Failure of Amanda’s Law in Kentucky: Creating Best Practices
for Legislatures Passing Domestic Violence Statutes, 38 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 41, 52 (2019).
6. Id. at 53.
7. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 158 (1824); see also Joyner v. Joyner, 59 N.C. 322, 324
(1862) (acquitting a husband on charges of domestic violence for wife’s failure to show the violence
was not caused by her own behavior).
8. Brinkley, supra note 5, at 57–58.
9. See generally Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13925–14045d (1994) (granting added protections and resources to women affected by
violence).
10. Brinkley, supra note 5, at 59.
11. Wagage, supra note 4, at 204.
12. Id. at 203–04.
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DV. 13 While there is still some criticism about mandatory arrest policies, 14 they
are still widely used and have helped shift the public’s perception of DV from a
private matter to a crime. 15 Like mandatory arrest policies, no-drop prosecutions
have helped the public understand the state’s interest in protecting victims of
DV. 16 No-drop prosecution policies require prosecutors to pursue DV cases
regardless of the victim’s wishes. 17 Like mandatory arrest policies, no-drop
prosecution policies come with pros and cons but continue to transform the
public’s perception of DV. 18 The picture today is a far cry from the traditional
perception of seeing DV as a private matter. But there are still gaps in the legal
response to the problem, which are the focus of this Note. One of the major gaps
is the issue of pretrial release.
In general, the defendant in a DV case may be released on conditional bail
or held in pretrial detention. 19 Bail statutes in most states allow for pretrial
detention if “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of any other person
and the community.” 20 These statutes inevitably apply to DV offenders because
they are arrested for, at the very least, putting people in fear for their safety. 21
These statutes, consequently, lead to a high pretrial detention population. 22 The
pretrial detention rate in the U.S., in general, is higher than any European or
Asian country. 23 In fact, pretrial detainees account for an astounding ninety-five
percent of the increase in jail population in the past twenty years. 24 These high
pretrial detention rates are not cheap. 25 The total annual cost of pretrial detention
is estimated to be fourteen billion dollars. 26

13. Id. at 204.
14. Id. at 205–06 (explaining drawbacks of mandatory arrest policies such as an increase
victim arrest in due to the initial event or a false complaint by the abuser and limited police
discretion).
15. Id. at 206.
16. See Wagage, supra note 4, at 206–08.
17. Id. at 206.
18. See id. at 206–08.
19. Id. at 211.
20. Id. at 212 (citing DAVID N. ADAIR, JR., FED. JUD. CTR., THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
1 (1993)).
21. See Wagage, supra note 4, at 212.
22. See id.
23. Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial
Detention and Release, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 2 (2017), https://scholar
ship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1745.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Despite this enormous cost, tax payers are still required to foot the bill for,
what some have called, a racist and discriminatory bail system. 27 The majority
of those detained have been, and continue to be, individuals from racial
minorities and low-income communities. 28 Black Americans are more likely to
be detained for a larger part of their sentence than white Americans. 29 Because
DV historically impacts Black communities at a higher rate than white
communities, Black defendants charged with DV have even more of a reason to
push for reform than white defendants charged with DV. 30 Moreover, the cash
bail system keeps those from low-income communities from being released. 31
The “$2 billion-per-year-for-profit bond industry” keeps those who cannot
afford bail detained and releases those who can. 32 Those who cannot afford bail
account for about half a million pretrial detainees. 33 For those who are detained,
they suffer considerable negative effects: increased rates of conviction,
disruptions in personal relationships, enhanced propensity for future crime, loss
of housing, and forfeiture of income. 34 Further, detainees are subject to
insufficient medical care and dangerous living conditions. 35 Especially in the era
of Covid-19, needlessly subjecting detainees to less-than-safe health conditions
is less than optimal. 36 The current issues with pretrial detention do not suggest
an abolishment of pretrial detention, but rather, some much-needed reform.

27. The social concerns of the bail system regarding racism and discriminatory practice plague
the entire system, and while this Note will not discuss those implications in detail, they are a
relevant part of any discussion on the topic of bail and pretrial detention. For a more comprehensive
understanding of these issues, see Michael L. Benson, The Correlation between Race and Domestic
Violence is Confounded with Community Context, 51 OXFORD J. 326, 327 (2004); Wendy Sawyer,
How Race Impacts Who is Detained, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.prison
policy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/; Adureh Onyekwere, How Cash Bail Works, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (June 2, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/howcash-bail-works.
28. Justin Sherman, The Bail System is Racist and Unjust. It Needs to Be Reformed,
REALCLEAR POL’Y (2018), https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2018/08/17/the_bail_system
_is_racist_and_unjust_it_needs_to_be_reformed_110764.html.
29. Id.
30. See Benson, supra note 27, at 327.
31. Sherman, supra note 28.
32. Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from
Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17
/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality.
33. Id.
34. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequence of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69
STAN. L. REV. 711, 741, 760; Wykstra, supra note 32.
35. Wykstra, supra note 32.
36. Id.; see also Brie A. Williams et al., Correction Facilities in the Shadow of Covid-19:
Unique Challenges and Proposed Solutions, HEALTH AFF., https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10
.1377/hblog20200324.784502/full/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2021).
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While not a perfect solution to the issues of pretrial detention, conditional
pretrial release is an alternative option. Those arrested for DV may be released
with a “combination of conditions [which] will reasonably assure the appearance
of the [defendant] as required and the safety of any other person and the
community.” 37 Though states have made an effort to implement reasonable
conditions, states have struggled to find a uniform approach on how to handle
competing interests: the risk of re-abuse, on one hand, and the defendant’s
constitutional rights on the other. 38
II. THE BALANCING ACT IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
Assigning pretrial release conditions requires a requires a balancing act
between protection of victims and constitutional rights of the defendant. 39 The
Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits excessive bail. 40
Moreover, pretrial release conditions have to be developed around the
presumptions of innocence to protect the basic principles of due process. 41 The
American Bar Association and the National Association of Pretrial Services
Agencies implemented standards for setting pretrial conditions which are echoed
in many state statutes and rules: “the least restrictive condition(s) of release that
will reasonably ensure a defendant’s attendance at court proceedings and protect
the community, victims, witnesses, or any other person.” 42
Protecting the community—especially the victim—from repeat DV abuse is
the state’s main interest in pretrial release. Victims are often scared to report
incidents of DV because of the fear of re-abuse. 43 In addition to the fear of reabuse, a lack of reporting comes from a belief that DV is a private matter, a
desire to protect the abuser, and a fear law enforcement would not help the
situation. 44 Victims’ fears are well-founded. Forty-four percent of abusers reabuse before they are even convicted. 45 In states where no-contact orders are
automatically imposed as a pretrial release condition for DV, rearrests for order
violations often occur immediately after the defendant’s release. 46 Studies have

37. See ADAIR, supra note 20, at 1.
38. See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 3.
39. Jane M. Sandusky, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJ., PRETRIAL RELEASE CONDITIONS
IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: ISSUES AND CONTEXT 5 (2006) [hereinafter BATTERED WOMEN’S
JUST. PROJ.].
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL
RELEASE 33 (2020) [hereinafter NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS.]).
42. NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS., supra note 41, at 19; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.2 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2007).
43. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 3, at 39.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. at 40.
46. Id. at 21.
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found that between twenty-seven and fifty percent of defendants live with their
victims at the time of a DV incident, so access to victims for re-abuse is ample. 47
The risk of re-abuse is real in part because victims are often economically
dependent on those who abuse them. Theoretically, limiting contact to the
defendant would prevent re-abuse; however, limiting contact could also interfere
with any economic reliance the victim had on the defendant. In one study
focusing on the relationship between dependency and women-DV victims,
psychologists suggested a woman’s economic and emotional dependency
increases the risk of abuse. 48 A woman who relies on her abuser for economic
stability is also less likely to terminate an abusive relationship, thereby making
re-abuse and abuser intimidation more likely. 49 Risk of re-abuse is even higher
in victims who are unemployed, economically disadvantaged, and living in
poorly-resourced neighborhoods. 50 A National Institute of Justice study found
one third of DV victims feared reporting because they relied on the defendant
for housing. 51 A victim who relies on a defendant to help with bills, parenting,
and housing seemingly cannot escape the pattern of abuse without added
resources. Thus, to properly address the state’s interests in pretrial release of DV
defendants, there needs to be conditions that address both the actual abuse and
the underlying causes of re-abuse.
While protecting a victim and the community is extremely important,
protecting a DV defendant’s right to due process is also necessary—and required
by the Constitution. The cornerstone of our criminal justice system is that one is
presumed innocent until proven guilty. 52 This framework protects a defendant
from undue burden until sufficient evidence demonstrates guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. However, common conditions of pretrial release or probation,
such as living restrictions and no-contact orders, place a significant burden on
defendants. While it makes sense to restrict a defendant from the place and
person where DV occurs, it raises serious due process issues. 53 The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments expressly protect defendants from punishment before
being convicted, but defendants argue pretrial release conditions appear to
expressly ignore that right. 54 Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment protects from

47. Id. at 56.
48. Robert F. Bornstein, The Complex Relationship Between Dependency and Domestic
Violence: Converging Psychological Factors and Social Forces, 61 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N 595, 601
(2006).
49. Id. at 599.
50. Megan L. Evans et al., A Pandemic within a Pandemic—Intimate Partner Violence during
COVID-19, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2302, 2302 (2020).
51. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 3, at 39.
52. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); see infra Part IV.B.
54. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see infra Part IV.B.
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excessive bail, but many low-income individuals are forced to find alternative
housing or pay for electronic monitoring, which might be considered
“excessive.” 55 DV occurs more frequently in low-income communities. 56 Due
to economic instability (and reduced shelter capacity during the pandemic),
defendants (who may be subject to protection orders barring them from entering
the homes they share with their purported victims) face challenges finding
alternative housing arrangements. 57 Aside from the economic ramifications,
restricting an individual from speaking to their own family, sleeping in their own
home, or going where they want is certainly a restriction of freedom. The
question is whether these restrictions can be justified under the law.
Without properly addressing these two competing interests, pretrial release
falls short of being an alternative option to pretrial detention in DV cases
because there is often a risk to the victim and an undue burden on the defendant.
States attempt to balance those interests within their pretrial release statutes.
III. HOW STATES CURRENTLY ADDRESS PRETRIAL RELEASE IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES
States attempt to strike the necessary balance between safety and due
process in a variety of ways. Some states have specific statutes to handle DV;
other states categorize DV as general assault for purposes of bail. 58 Aside from
common conditions used in both non-DV and DV cases, 59 certain conditions are
more readily assigned in DV cases than non-DV cases in an attempt to strike the
DV balance. States use two different methods to assign these conditions:
mandatory pretrial release conditions or discretionary pretrial release conditions.
Statutes with mandatory conditions include a specific condition, which must be
placed on a defendant when they are released pre-trial. Discretionary conditions,
on the other hand, allow a judge to place conditions on the defendant after
assessing what conditions will ensure safety of the community while not
violating a defendant’s rights. 60 Most states employ a combination of these
methods. Appendix I provides a summary of state statutes based on these
conditions. Statutes with mandatory conditions are usually accompanied by a
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see infra Part IV.A.
56. Evans, supra note 50, at 2302; Amy E. Bonomi et al., (2014) Intimate Partner Violence
and Neighborhood Income: A Longitudinal Analysis. Violence Against Women 20:42-58.
57. Evans, supra note 50, at 2302.
58. Wagage, supra note 4, at 215.
59. See BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJ., supra note 39, at 7 (listing common pretrial release
conditions for non-DV cases: not committing a crime, attendance at court proceedings, maintain
employment or seeking employment, comply with curfew, no possession of a firearm, report to
pretrial services regularly, obtain “medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment,” and remain in
custody of a third party).
60. See id. at 5–6 (detailing considerations for the court before pretrial release conditions are
assigned).
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provision allowing a judge to place additional conditions at her discretion. For
states without mandatory conditions, the judge simply relies on discretionary
conditions. Likewise, statutes with mandatory conditions are often accompanied
by a provision allowing a victim to waive a mandatory condition. Conditions
common to DV cases include temporary holds, restrictions on returning to
shared residence or employment, no-contact orders, and enrollment of
counseling.
A.

Temporary Holds

One common condition is a temporary hold prior to releasing the defendant
after arrest. 61 These temporary holds are often called “cooling-off” periods. 62
Some states write temporary holds into their statutes as an added condition that
a judge may impose, whereas in other states, temporary holds are required before
pretrial release is even considered. Because forty-four percent of DV defendants
re-abuse prior to their conviction, 63 the period following the initial arrest for DV
can be particularly sensitive. 64 The cooling-off period allows delayed release of
defendants whom may be dangerous to their victims. 65 The period also gives a
victim time to collect belongings from their home, secure a place to stay, or find
DV resources if the defendant will be returning to a home shared with the
victim. 66 Currently, Alabama, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Tennessee
have statutes that implement a mandatory cooling-off period. 67 In Indiana, the
DV defendant cannot be released until at least eight hours after the arrest. 68 In
Massachusetts, an individual arrested for DV “shall not be allowed to post bail
within six hours” of arrest. 69 In Nevada, an individual arrested for domestic
battery must not be released sooner than twelve hours. 70
Some states take a slightly more lenient approach, allowing the judge to first
consider the threat level to the victim before enforcing a temporary hold. In
Alabama, an individual arrested for DV may not be released until twenty-four

61. CONN. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TEMPORARY HOLDS FOLLOWING AN
ARREST: GIVING VICTIMS TIME TO FIND SAFETY 2 (2015) [hereinafter CONN. COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE].
62. Id.
63. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 3, at 40.
64. CONN. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 61, at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. ALA. CODE § 15-13-190(a) (2019); IND. CODE § 35-33-8-6.5 (2021); CONN. COAL.
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 61, at 2.
68. IND. CODE § 35-33-8-6.5 (2021).
69. CONN. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 61, at 2.
70. NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(7) (2020).
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hours after an arrest or an appearance in front of a judge, whichever is sooner. 71
During the hold, the judge is instructed to assess if the defendant is a threat to
the victim or the public and if the defendant will appear in court. 72 The same is
true in North Carolina, except a forty-eight hour hold is allowed. 73 Notably,
Tennessee enforces a mandatory twelve-hour hold only after the defendant is
deemed to be a threat to the victim. 74 These special provisions allow a judge
slight discretion to make a case-specific analysis, rather than blindly assigning
conditions without regard to the defendant. 75 On the other hand, states without
a mandatory temporary hold often implement a hold as a discretionary
condition. 76 The more liberal use of discretion allows a judge to consider a
defendant’s employment, financial status, family, criminal history, and the
victim’s desire for the hold to continue.
B.

Restricted from Returning to Shared Residence or Employment

Another condition commonly imposed is a restriction on returning to one’s
residence or place of employment if shared with the victim. States presumably
use this condition as an attempt to mitigate the danger of re-abuse. One state in
particular, Alaska, places a mandatory twenty-day restriction on DV defendants
after pretrial release. 77 In Alaska, if there is a protective order against the
defendant, the judge is required to prohibit return to the “residence or place of
employment of the victim” unless:
(1) 20 days have elapsed following the date the person was arrested; (2) the
victim or petitioner consents to the person’s return to the residence or place of
employment; (3) the person does not have a prior conviction for an offense under
AS 11.41 that is a crime involving domestic violence; and (4) the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the return to the residence or place of
employment does not pose a danger to the victim or petitioner. 78

Louisiana and West Virginia place a similar restriction on defendants—although
with no set timeframe given. 79 If the court determines the defendant poses a risk

71. ALA. CODE § 15-13-190(a) (2019); see also MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-5-37(2) (2021)
(allowing a judge to ”impose on the arrested person a holding period not to exceed twenty-four (24)
hours from the time of the initial appearance or setting of bail”).
72. ALA. CODE § 15-13-190(b) (2019).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(a)(1), (b) (2020).
74. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150(h)(1) (2020).
75. See id.
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113(e) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(1) (West 2021);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2 (VIII) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-26(d) (2013); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-534.1(a)(1) (2020); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(5) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7802(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2020).
77. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027(b) (2020).
78. Id.
79. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 320(G) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-17c (2020).
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to the victim, the court is mandated to prohibit the defendant from going to the
victim’s residence. 80 Pennsylvania has this same restriction; however, this
condition expires at commencement of a pretrial hearing or upon entry or denial
of a protection of abuse order, whichever is sooner. 81 Moreover, Wisconsin is
one state that does not first require a threat assessment; the state automatically
places a seventy-two-hour prohibition on returning to the shared residence. 82
However, Wisconsin does allow the victim to waive this condition. 83
While this condition is useful in protecting the victim, a mandatory
condition of this nature severely burdens the defendant. Most states attempt to
reconcile the potential legal ramifications of this burden by making this
condition wholly discretionary; 84 some states allow a limited discretionary
component: a threat assessment by the judge or a waiver by the victim. 85 Other
states take a more generalized approach and include restrictions on employment
or residence as “conditions reasonably necessary for the protection” of the
victims. 86 But the judge’s discretion does not change the fact that an individual
is being displaced from their home or employment after this condition is applied.
C. No-Contact Orders
No-contact orders are another tool states use to protect against further
conflict. 87 The no-contact order restricts the defendant’s contact with the victim
in the case. 88 Often times, these restrictions can include contact with children,
family, and friends. 89 Multiple states have implemented mandatory no-contact
orders in their DV statutes: Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and West Virginia. In Colorado, a mandatory protective order is placed
in all DV cases. 90 In Georgia, the judge “shall include” a no-contact order as a
release condition for offenses involving DV; the defendant cannot have any

80. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 320(G) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-17c (2020).
81. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(c)(2) (2020).
82. WIS. STAT. § 968.075(5)(a)(1) (2021).
83. Id. § 968.075(5)(c).
84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-113(e) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63c (2021); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (West 2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-26a (2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1) (McKinney 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A534.1(a)(2) (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.260(1)(b) (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-120(C),
(D)(2) (2021).
85. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 320(G) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-17c (2020).
86. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.6b (2018).
87. Robert Rhodes, Criminal No Contact Orders—What Are They?, RHODES LEGAL GRP.,
https://rhodeslegalgroup.com/criminal-law/criminal-contact-orders/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2021)
[hereinafter RHODES LEGAL GRP.].
88. WASH. REV. CODE. § 10.99.040 (2021).
89. RHODES LEGAL GRP., supra note 87.
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-1001(1) (2020).
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contact “of any kind or character with the victim.” 91 In Louisiana and West
Virginia, if there is a finding of threat or danger to the victim, the judge shall
issue a no-contact order. 92 In Rhode Island, there is a mandatory no-contact
order placed on the DV defendant prior to the arraignment. 93 In South Dakota,
a mandatory no-contact order is put in place in the event of pretrial release. 94
Furthermore, in Wisconsin’s seventy-two-hour cooling-off period, the defendant
is not permitted to contact any victim or person involved in the DV incident. 95
Unique to Louisiana and Wisconsin, the victim can waive a mandatory nocontact order. 96 Most states, however, allow a no-contact order to be added as a
pretrial release condition. Those statutes that take the discretionary approach
either include no-contact orders explicitly or implicitly. If explicitly stated, the
condition includes language saying the defendant should “avoid contacting . . .
the alleged victim.” 97 If implied, the statute includes a condition that gives the
judge the right to issue “any other order or modification of orders required . . .
to protect the safety of the alleged victim or to ensure the appearance of the
person in court.” 98
Discretionary or mandatory, no-contact orders place a tremendous burden
on defendants and victims. Defendants are not only restricted from the victims,
but also from their children. 99 The defendants are deprived from parenting their
own children which ultimately places a greater burden on the other parent. With
a higher risk of abuse in economically and emotionally dependent relationships,
the fear of not being able to speak to your significant other might also drive
victims to waive a no-contact order when contact is not otherwise safe. 100
D. Enrollment in Counseling or Treatment
Another common condition of pretrial release is counseling. Similar to those
arrested on drug charges undergoing drug treatment, those arrested for DV

91. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(f)(2) (2020).
92. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 320(G) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-17c (2020).
93. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-4(a)(1) (2021).
94. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-23 (2021).
95. WIS. STAT. § 968.075(5) (2021).
96. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 320(G) (2020); WIS. STAT. § 968.075(5) (2021).
97. WIS. STAT. § 968.075(5) (2021); accord MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-5-37(2) (2021); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-26 10(a) (2021); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12 (McKinney 2021); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(a)(2) (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.260(1)(b) (2019); W. VA. CODE § 6
2-1C-17c (2020).
98. ALA. CODE § 15-13-190(b) (2019); accord ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (2020); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1-1001(3)(f) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (West 2021); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 765.6b (2018); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-5-37 (2021).
99. RHODES LEGAL GRP., supra note 87.
100. See Bornstein, supra note 48, at 601.
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undergo counseling as a pretrial release condition. 101 Counseling for those
arrested for DV can include anger management treatment, DV treatment, or
victim-oriented treatment. 102 A special pretrial services agency often provides
the intervention programs for the defendant. 103 Georgia is the only state to
impose a mandatory condition of counseling; the state requires enrollment in
“[DV] counseling, substance abuse therapy, or other therapeutic” counseling as
a pretrial release condition. 104 Most states, however, impose this condition on a
discretionary basis. States that use the discretionary approach do so by assigning
conditions relevant to the DV case. 105 For example, a defendant with a pattern
of DV under the influence of drugs could be instructed to attend a substance
abuse program in addition to DV treatment. 106 Even though states allow
counseling or treatment as a pretrial condition, most judges limit its use because
the condition raises issues with the presumption of innocence. 107
Temporary holds, restrictions on residence and employment, no-contact
orders, and counseling are not an exclusive list of conditions judges impose on
DV defendants. There are other conditions a court often imposes in DV cases:
electronic monitoring, drug testing, prohibiting drinking, curfews, and
prohibiting possession of a firearm. 108 While the conditions themselves are a
necessary consideration in finding a balance between victims’ and defendants’
interests, how the conditions are implemented is equally important. Among the
inconsistent conditions and statutes relating to pretrial release conditions in DV
cases, one thing is consistent: discretion is necessary.
IV. HOW SHOULD STATES ADDRESS PRETRIAL RELEASE IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES
According to the American Bar Association, the goal of bail is to (1) ensure
defendants’ appearance, (2) prevent obstruction of justice, and (3) prevent other
pretrial crime, all while minimizing intrusions to defendants’ liberty. 109 The best
possible scenario for pretrial release is one where the conditions placed are
101. U.S. CTS., AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SUBSTANCE USE TESTING AND SUBSTANCE USE
DISORDER TREATMENT (updated March 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/probation-and-pretrial-services/supervision/authority-impose-substance-use-testing-sub
stance-use-disorder-treatment [hereinafter SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER TREATMENT].
102. Thomas P. George, Domestic Violence Sentencing Conditions and Recidivism, WASH.
CTR. FOR CT. RSCH., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS. 12 tbl.3 (2010).
103. Pretrial Services—Supervision Unit, SUPERIOR CT. OF FULTON CNTY., https://www.ful
toncourt.org/pretrial/supervision.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(f)(2) (2020).
105. See State v. Mahoney, No. 2010-104, 2010 WL 7798871, at *3 (Vt. Mar. 25, 2010).
106. Id.
107. BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJ., supra note 39, at n.21; see infra Part IV.B.
108. See BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJ., supra note 39, at 7.
109. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.2; see also Stevenson &
Mayson, supra note 23, at 4.
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specific to the defendant’s personal situation and the least restrictive means to
protect the general public. 110 But what is “best”?
A.

Success in Non-DV Pretrial Release

Empirical data evaluating what works best in DV pretrial release conditions
is extremely limited. The data is limited, in part, because DV is a newer crime
and jurisdictions are still working to understand it. With a newer crime comes
newer conditions—and only recent, aggressively-prosecuted conditions that
have not been studied enough are available for analysis. On the other hand, it is
difficult to know how to quantify success of pretrial release conditions in such a
new crime. Should success be measured by rates of re-abuse, rates of condition
violations, or rates of conviction? All of those things, presumably, should be
taken into account, but more research is necessary to conclusively say what is
successful. Moreover, empirical studies for success in non-DV cases do not
provide judges any extra guidance in DV cases. The limited data available
highlights that we truly do not know what is successful when it comes to pretrial
release conditions.
1.

Meetings with Pretrial Officers

Meetings with pretrial officers are one of the most frequently utilized
conditions of pretrial release; however, they are generally shown to have no
effect on defendants’ future criminal activity. 111 While one study did find a
positive effect on reappearance, the study did not find any reduction in new
criminal activity. 112 For DV cases, these statistics are concerning; a reduction in
new criminal activity is a necessity to protect victims. Moreover, defendants
who are under supervision of a pretrial officer show increased re-incarceration
rates because defendants are more likely to be arrested for a violation of their
pretrial release conditions. 113 For instance, a common pretrial condition is
employment; ironically, requiring a defendant to continuously take off work for
meetings with a pretrial officer puts the defendant at risk for losing their job.
Also, the meetings which are typically held with a pretrial services officer are
expensive and time-consuming. 114 The meetings provide almost no deterrent
effect and do little to assist in providing the officer with “information necessary
to intervene if troubles arrive.” 115

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 20.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 18.
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Drug Testing

Similarly, drug testing is another condition with little empirical data to back
up its use. Defendants who have a pattern of DV while under the influence of
illegal drugs or who have a pattern of substance abuse are often required to
perform regular drug testing while released. 116 Even though substance abuse has
been linked to an increased risk of re-abuse, the limited data available on drug
testing as a pretrial release condition shows drug testing is ineffective in
reducing failure to appear (“FTA”) or rearrest. 117 One study did find reduced
drug usage and rearrest when drug testing was paired with “swift, certain, and
fair” punishments, but its results have yet to be replicated. 118 Drug testing places
a sizable burden on a DV defendant to report for testing at any time. 119 The
defendant may have to find transportation and childcare to report for testing. 120
Further, the state takes on the financial burden to pay for testing and salaries for
those reviewing the results. 121 Reduced drug use in DV cases post-release is
important, but drug testing as a pretrial release condition is ineffective to
accomplish this goal.
3.

Electronic Monitoring (“EM”)

Conversely, EM has shown to be more promising as an effective pretrial
release condition. 122 For DV cases, there are two types of EM. 123 One type of
EM equips the victim and the police with a transmitter, while the other type
equips only the police with a transmitter. 124 EM alone does not physically
protect a victim; the monitoring serves as a warning that the defendant is nearby.
So, providing a transmitter to both the victim and the police raises EM’s
effectiveness. 125 Like other pretrial conditions, the research is limited. 126
However, the continued research does show a positive effect on criminal
activity. 127 In a California study, EM was found to reduce criminal activity after
116. See BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJ., supra note 39, at 13, 16.
117. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 19; see Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., The Danger
Assessment: Validation of a Lethality Risk Assessment Instrument for Intimate Partner Femicide,
24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 653, 655 tbl.1 (2009).
118. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 19.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Edna Erez et al., Electronic Monitoring of Domestic Violence Cases—A Study of Two
Bilateral Programs, 68 FED. PROB. 1 (2004), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/68_1
_3_0.pdf.
124. Id.
125. Electronic Monitoring of Abusers, RESEARCHNET, http://criminal-justice.iresearchnet
.com/crime/domestic-violence/electronic-monitoring-of-abusers/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
126. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 19.
127. Id.
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release among gang members and sex offenders. 128 In multiple Florida studies,
EM aided in the reduction of rearrest on technical violations, reoffending, and
voluntary FTA. 129 While EM is the condition with the most positive statistics, it
also happens to be one of the most intrusive and burdensome conditions on the
defendant. 130 A study of incarcerated individuals considered EM “only slightly
less onerous than incarceration.” 131 The defendant’s every move is monitored
and often times restricted to certain areas. EM interferes with family
relationships and employment. 132 It places “shame and stigma” on a defendant
for a crime not yet proven beyond a reasonable doubt. While the state pays for
the equipment and the monitoring, the defendant is often charged a fee to be
monitored. 133 The success rates of EM has led to its overuse on individuals who
are not a threat to the community. 134 So while successful, EM cannot be used
pervasively.
4.

The Disproportionate Effect of Pretrial Release Conditions

Not only do pretrial release conditions in non-DV cases have limited success
rates, many of them unequivocally burden low-income communities. 135 The
disproportionate effect on low-income communities is supposed to be a driving
factor in criminal justice reform, but these pretrial conditions do not seem to be
helping. For example, a requirement to meet a pretrial release officer or pass a
drug test imposes a significant time burden on the defendant. 136 The defendant
might have to take time off from work or school to attend these meetings and
pay for transportation or a babysitter. Lower-income defendants, which make up
the majority of DV defendants, 137 cannot afford to continually take time off
work to get drug tested or meet with an officer. Further, requiring the defendant
to pay a fee to be electronically monitored strains lower-income defendants more
than middle-class or upper-class defendants.
In conclusion, with limited empirical data and a continued disproportionate
effect on lower-income communities, what is successful in non-DV pretrial
release conditions remains largely unanswered—and thereby provides limited

128. Id.
129. Id. at 20.
130. Id.
131. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, 20.
132. Id. See infra APPENDIX I for proposed legislation.
133. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 20.
134. Id.
135. Id.; See Ethan Corey & Puck Lo, The ‘Failure to Appear’ Fallacy, APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/the-failure-to-appear-fallacy/.
136. Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 23, at 17.
137. Callie M. Rennison & Sarah Welchans, Special Report, Intimate Partner Violence, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 2002) at 4. Deborah M. Capaldi et al., A Systematic Review of Risk Factors
for Intimate Partner Violence, 3 PARTNER ABUSE 231, 242–43 (Nov. 2, 2012).
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guidance to DV cases. But from what we do know, the best practice for pretrial
release is a system “tailored to the specific risk a defendant presents and . . . the
least restrictive means available to reasonably reduce the risk.” 138 To that end,
the best practice for pretrial release in DV cases would also be one that is tailored
to each defendant with the “least restrictive” conditions sufficient to protect the
victim.
B.

Legal Challenges to Pretrial Release Conditions

In addition to statistical success in pretrial release conditions, legality of
those conditions is relevant to what is “best” in pretrial release for DV cases.
Pretrial release conditions constantly give rise to litigation—too many to be
covered in the course of this Note. The conditions in DV cases most notably give
rise to litigation arguing whether the defendant’s rights were violated in the
interest of protecting the victim. 139 The arguments that fail often do so because
most statutes give overarching discretion to the court to use any combination of
conditions to ensure safety of the victim, leaving little room for an abuse of
discretion. 140 Defendants released pretrial with conditions argue the conditions
are a deprivation of their rights prior to conviction. 141 Specifically, legal
challenges center around the prohibition of excessive bail, the Equal Protection
Clause, the presumption of innocence, and the right to due process.
1.

Challenges Based on Excessive Bail Arguments

In a Sixth Circuit case, a defendant challenged the Tennessee law allowing
a DV defendant to be held for twelve hours if the defendant is deemed a threat
to the victim. 142 The defendant in Fields allegedly choked and hit his wife,
resulting in cuts and bruises on the wife’s body. 143 Subsequently, the defendant
was held for twelve hours without bail and was released with conditions. 144
Prosecutors dropped the charges against the defendant ten months after arrest,
and the defendant then filed suit in federal court; he alleged the law, which
allowed a twelve-hour hold, violated his rights of excessive bail and due
process. 145 The court unequivocally shut down the defendant’s argument

138. Id. at 20.
139. Williams v. State, 151 P.3d 460, 463–64 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
140. See ALA. CODE § 15-13-190(b) (2019); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (2020); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-1001(3)(c) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740 (West 2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 765.6b (2018); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-5-37 (2021).
141. Fields v. Henry, 701 F.3d 180, 186 (6th. Cir. 2012).
142. Id. at 183; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-150(h)(1) (2020).
143. Fields, 701 F.3d at 182.
144. Id. at 182–83.
145. Id. at 183.
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regarding a violation of the Eighth Amendment, stating the Amendment does
not address timing of bail, but rather only the amount. 146
In regards to the defendant’s due process rights, he alleged a temporary hold
violated his “constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right of bail”
granted to him by Tennessee law. 147 The court states the three necessary
requirements of a procedural due process claim: “(1) a life, liberty, or property
interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause, and (2) a deprivation
of that interest (3) without adequate process.” 148 Defendant failed to prove the
first requirement. 149 Under state law, a protected liberty interest exists where a
state places “substantive limitations on official conduct” which afford
mandatory conditions and where the state law mandates a specific outcome in
the “official conduct.” 150 The court reasoned the Tennessee law only requires a
defendant not be released for twelve hours after arrest if deemed to be a threat;
it does not mandate repercussions if there was no finding of threat. 151 Therefore,
the Tennessee state law did not create a liberty interest to meet the requirements
of a procedural due process claim. 152
2.

Challenges Based on Equal Protection

Statutes that impose a mandatory condition on a defendant without taking
into consideration case-specific facts have been struck down as
unconstitutional. 153 Currently in Alaska, if there is a protective order filed
against the defendant, a defendant released on bail following a DV arrest cannot
return to their residence for twenty days provided the residence is shared with
the victim. 154 If the victim consents, the defendant does not have a prior
conviction, or the court finds “clear and convincing evidence” the return to the
residence will not endanger the victim, then this condition may be waived. 155
Prior to the current version of the statute, a condition of release from a DV arrest
prohibited the defendant from returning to the shared residence. 156 There was no
discretion afforded to the court. 157
146. Fields, 701 F.3d at 185; see also Westerman v. Carey, 892 P.2d 1067, 1075 (Wash. 1994)
(finding the right to bail does not attach until after the preliminary appearance).
147. Fields, 701 F.3d at 185.
148. Id. (citing Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 186 (citing Gibson v. McMurray, 159 F.3d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1998)).
151. Id. at 187.
152. Fields, 701 F.3d at 186 (citing Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164-65 (6th Cir. 1994);
Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325,332 (7th Cir. 1993); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1107 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
153. Williams v. State, 151 P.3d 460, 471 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
154. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (b) (2020).
155. Id.
156. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (b) (1996) (repealed 2010).
157. Id.
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In a 2006 Alaska case, a DV defendant challenged the previous version of
the statute when he was forbidden to return to his shared residence with his wife
and daughter as a pretrial release condition. 158 The defendant was arrested for
strangling his wife and pushing her to the ground during an argument in their
home. 159 Both the defendant and the victim asked the district court multiple
times for a modification of the pretrial release condition. 160 Eventually, contact
was allowed between victim and the defendant but no change was made to
prohibition on residency. 161 The victim argued the condition placed a costly
burden on the family to find a place to spend holidays together outside the home,
the defendant was no longer a threat to her, and the incident had simply been
overexaggerated by the police. 162 The defendant argued the condition violated
the Equal Protection Clause because the condition limited his liberty where he
posed no danger to the victim. 163 Furthermore, the defendant argued the
condition violated due process by restricting the right to live in his family home
without an opportunity for a hearing. 164 The state, in turn, argued the defendant
may have “psychological or emotional forces” over a victim rendering it
impossible to determine if it is safe for the defendant to return, and so the state
has a strong interest in the law. 165 Before ultimately finding the statute
unconstitutional, the court acknowledged the difficult balancing act in a DV
case.
The State undoubtedly has a legitimate and compelling interest in preventing
domestic violence—and in preventing a person accused of domestic violence
from tampering with the alleged victim’s testimony. On the other hand, the
government has no legitimate interest in barring a person who poses no
appreciable risk of harming or intimidating the victim from returning to a shared
residence. Given the importance of the right to live with a member of one’s
family, we will invalidate the classification if we find an insufficiently tight fit
between the purposes of the statute and the means used to accomplish those
purposes and if less restrictive alternatives are available. 166

The state’s argument overlooked less restrictive solutions from other
jurisdictions where return to the residence is not guaranteed to be safe. 167
Notably, less restrictive solutions allow the victim to request the defendant
return to the residence or allow the judge to review the case before an automatic
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Williams v. State, 151 P.3d 460, 462 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 462–63.
Williams v. State, 151 P.3d 460, 462 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 468–69 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5; WIS. STAT. § 968.075).
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prohibition of return to residence. 168 The court reasoned not granting discretion
within the statute creates an overly broad statute; the statute could be applied to
both cases where the state’s interest is outweighed by the constitutional rights of
the defendant and cases where the constitutional rights of the defendant
outweighed the state’s interests. 169 A DV defendant pretrial “retains an
important liberty interest in choosing their family living arrangements.” 170
Interestingly, while the prohibition of returning to the residence was legal, the
court argued the condition was potentially “no longer serving its intended
purpose” once contact outside the residence was no longer restricted. 171 This
perhaps raises the consideration that pretrial release conditions need to be
reviewed regularly during each defendant’s pretrial period to see if they are still
serving the state’s interests.
3.

Challenges Based on Presumption of Innocence

Additionally, defendants argue pretrial conditions violate the bedrock
principle of the criminal justice system: an individual is innocent until proven
guilty. In a Colorado state case, a DV defendant succeeded with that
argument. 172 In Martell v. County Court of County of Summit, a defendant
arrested on DV charges challenged his pretrial release condition of counseling
on that principle. 173 The trial court ordered the defendant to complete counseling
subject to a now-repealed Colorado law that gave judges discretion to impose
conditions which “may include submission of the defendant to the supervision
of some qualified person or organization.” 174 Not only did the court reason
“supervision” under the statute did not include counseling, but the court further
reasoned counseling as a pretrial release condition raises issues with a
defendant’s right against self-incrimination and presumed innocence under the
Fifth Amendment. 175
Conversely, in People v. Bongiovanni, a court found counseling to be a
constitutional reminder to the DV defendant that his release pretrial could be
revoked—instead of a tool that implies guilt. 176 The defendant in that case was
arrested for DV and released with a condition to attend “alternative to violence”
168. Williams v. State, 151 P.3d 460, 468–69 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
169. Id. at 467.
170. Id. at 470.
171. Id. at 468.
172. Martell v. Cnty. Ct. of Cnty. of Summit, 854 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Colo. App. 1992).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1331; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-103(2) (repealed 2013).
175. Martell, 854 P.2d at 1330.
176. People v. Bongiovanni, 183 Misc. 2d 104, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (“Rather than
implying guilt, attendance at the [counseling] program, in tandem with its educational benefits,
remind the defendant, . . . that although at liberty, he is still bound by the dictates of the court,
which can rescind his liberty on his failure to abide by those dictates.”).
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counseling subject to a New York state law allowing a judge to include any
additional conditions to pretrial release that are reasonable. 177 In the court’s
opinion, counseling is no different than no-contact orders or restrictions of
living; it is simply “a tool for the court” to protect the victim. 178 Moreover, the
court reasoned an order of protection in conjunction with counseling is more
likely to prevent violations of the order of protection. 179
4.

Challenges Based on Due Process

Another constitutional concern of defendants is their right to be heard before
being deprived of their rights. In a Supreme Court of Connecticut case, the
defendant, who was arrested for DV, appealed the denial of an evidentiary
hearing before the issuance of a criminal protective order. 180 The state, in turn,
argued the law does not require an “evidentiary hearing.” 181 Because the law did
not specify how the “hearing shall be conducted, or what the defendant’s rights”
were during the hearing, the court turned to statutory interpretation to make its
decision. 182 The court interpreted the statute to mean that a full evidentiary
hearing was not needed because it was not expressly stated in the statute. 183 The
statute only requires the trial court to consider oral argument and
recommendation by a family violence unit at the hearing. 184 In addition to the
lack of explicit instruction, the court highlights “the need for expeditious
assumptions of judicial control” at the preliminary phase to prevent unnecessary
delay in the court system. 185 The court reasoned, however, a defendant is entitled
to be heard on the issue of the protective order at a subsequent hearing. 186 The
defendant is given the right to seek modification of their conditions or a more
extensive hearing, whereupon, the state is required to show by preponderance of
the evidence that the criminal protective order is still satisfying the state’s
interest. 187 In summary, the court reasoned the defendant was not entitled to be
fully heard prior to the issuance of a criminal protective order for the sake of
preventing a backlog of cases in the criminal justice system, but is entitled to a
177. Id. at 105–06.
178. Id. at 106.
179. Id.
180. State v. Fernando A., 981 A.2d 427, 432 (Conn. 2009); McManis Faulkner, Criminal
Protective Orders and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders—Nine Essential Things to Know,
JDSUPRA (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/criminal-protective-orders-anddomestic-44407/ (detailing provisions of a criminal protective order which include no-contact
orders, move-out orders, and personal conduct orders).
181. Fernando, 981 A.2d at 434 (emphasis added); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63c (2008).
182. Fernando, 981 A.2d at 437.
183. Id. at 440–41.
184. Id. at 445.
185. Id. at 439 (citing State v. Doe, 675 A.2d 518, 609 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000)).
186. State v. Fernando A., 981 A.2d 427, 442–43 (Conn. 2009).
187. Id. at 439–40.
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full hearing after the protective order is already in place. 188 The backlog of cases
is a serious and growing issue in criminal court, 189 but is a backlog of cases a
sufficient reason to prohibit a defendant from being heard until after his
freedoms have already been restricted?
While most legal challenges are overcome by the state’s interest in
protecting the victim, they do give rise to important considerations when
assigning pretrial release conditions. The case law above seems to suggest as
long as the condition serves the state’s interest, is applied considering casespecific facts, and does not violate statutory or constitutional rights, then the
condition can be used. But when does a condition stop serving the state’s
interest? Who should get to present case-specific facts to the judge? Even if the
condition does not violate a defendant’s legal rights, can a condition be so
morally wrong to prohibit its use? All of these considerations are crucial to
setting up a successful pretrial release system for DV cases.
C. Recommendations for a Successful Pretrial Release Practice in DV Cases
Unsurprisingly, limited empirical data and numerous legal challenges have
led to a less-than-uniform approach to pretrial release in DV cases among states.
Statutes must address two competing interests: the state’s interest in protecting
the victim and the defendant’s interest in protecting his constitutional rights. A
statute where both interests converge is ideal; arguably, that is easier said than
done. However, a statute that allows case-specific facts to play a role in the
decision would assure both interests are at least being considered—and
hopefully successfully met. 190
1.

Training

Before a judge or a third party analyzes case-specific facts, they should be
trained on why those facts matter. In most states, the party assigning conditions
is a judge. The judge should be well-informed on the causes and risks associated
with DV. However, according to a program by the National Judicial Education
Program, only thirty-five percent of judges felt they had enough knowledge
about DV to make effective decisions. 191 Despite this, only eighteen states

188. Id. at 445.
189. See Robert Lewis, Justice Delayed: Courts Overwhelmed by Pandemic Backlog,
CAPRADIO (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.capradio.org/articles/2021/01/20/justice-delayed-courtsoverwhelmed-by-pandemic-backlog/.
190. See infra APPENDIX II for a proposed model statute.
191. PETER JAFFE, CTR. FOR RSCH. & EDUC. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & CHILDREN,
ENHANCING JUDICIAL SKILLS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 26 (Nov. 12, 2010), https://www.fu
tureswithoutviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/ejs-report-nov-12.pdf [hereinafter ENHANCING
JUDICIAL SKILLS].
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required mandatory DV training for judges. 192 Judges should be mandated to
receive specialized DV training on success of pretrial release conditions, victim
retraction, danger assessment, recidivism, and impact on children. 193
2.

Case-Specific Facts

Once the judge is well-trained in DV to analyze causes and risks, the judge
should receive case-specific facts through pretrial services. Pretrial services
programs have played a large role in the bail reform movement. 194 One of the
largest roles they have played is helping the bail system move from cash bail to
conditional bail by assessing conditions that would be suitable. 195 Pretrial
services can assess the risk a defendant poses to the victim before release. 196 One
county in North Carolina has piloted a specialized pretrial services program for
DV cases. 197 The pretrial staff underwent extensive training to identify
aggressors, crisis intervention, and the effects of DV. 198 Prior to release or bail
consideration, pretrial services assess the risk of the defendant by pulling
criminal history, interviewing applicable parties, and preparing a report for the
judge. 199 Ideally, pretrial services would utilize Jacquelyn Campbell’s Danger
Assessment tool. 200 The Danger Assessment tool is a formalized data-driven tool
used to assess “the likelihood of lethality or near lethality occurring in a case of
intimate partner violence.” 201 Incorporating a risk assessment tool, like this one,
allows a victim to have an active role in the case without being forced to confront
their abuser in court. If the defendant does not see the victim actively engaged
in the case, it may potentially lower the risks of retaliation or recantation.
Campbell’s tool requires a victim to answer the following yes-or-no questions:
1. Has the physical violence increased in severity or frequency over the past
year?
2. Does he 202 own a gun?

192. The Verdict Is In: Mandate Domestic Violence Training for Judges, MARY BYRON PROJ.
(July 8, 2015), https://www.marybyronproject.org/2015/07/08/the-verdict-is-in-mandate-domestic
-violence-training-for-judges/.
193. See ENHANCING JUDICIAL SKILLS, supra note 191, at 8.
194. Pretrial Services & Supervision, PRETRIAL JUST. CTR. FOR CTS., https://www.ncsc.org
/pjcc/topics/pretrial-services (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. MARINA DUANE & CARLA VASQUEZ-NORIEGA, URBAN INST., PRETRIAL STRATEGY FOR
HANDLING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE CASES 1 (Oct. 2018).
198. Id. at 8.
199. Id.
200. Wagage, supra note 4, at 198–99.
201. Id. at 198; Campbell, supra note 117, at 653.
202. Campbell, supra note 117, at 655 tbl.1 (“‘He’ refers to your husband, partner, ex-husband,
ex-partner, or whoever is currently physically hurting you”).
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3. Have you left him after living together during the past year?
3a.(If have never lived with him, check here ___)
4. Is he unemployed?
5. Has he ever used a weapon against you or threatened you with a lethal
weapon?
5a.(If yes, was the weapon a gun? ___)
6. Does he threaten to kill you?
7. Has he avoided being arrested for domestic violence?
8. Do you have a child that is not his?
9. Has he ever forced you to have sex when you did not wish to do so?
10. Does he ever try to choke you?
11. Does he use illegal drugs? By drugs, I mean “uppers” or amphetamines,
“meth”, speed, angel dust, cocaine, “crack”, street drugs, or mixtures.
12. Is he an alcoholic or problem drinker?
13. Does he control most or all of your daily activities? (For instance: does he
tell you who you can be friends with, when you can see your family, how
much money you can use, or when you can take the car?
13a.(If he tries, but you do not let him, check here: ___)
14. Is he violently and constantly jealous of you?
(For instance, does he say, “If I can’t have you, no one can.”)
15. Have you ever been beaten by him while you were pregnant?
(If you have never been pregnant by him, check here: ___)
16. Has he ever threatened or tried to commit suicide?
17. Does he threaten to harm your children?
18. Do you believe he is capable of killing you?
19. Does he follow or spy on you, leave threatening notes or messages on
answering machine, destroy your property, or call you when you don’t want
him to?
20. Have you ever threated or tried to commit suicide? 203

While pretrial services are collecting data, the defendant should be held for up
to seventy-two hours or until a report is completed—whichever is sooner.
During the temporary hold, the defendant shall not be allowed to contact the
victim. The temporary no-contact order will protect the victim from being
persuaded to fill out the Danger Assessment in a particular way. The temporary
no-contact order should be waivable for emergency situations; however, contact
shall be supervised by pretrial services. These answers to the Danger Assessment
203. Id.
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along with other information collected by pretrial services would then be
complied into a report and given to the judge to review prior to a bail hearing.
3.

Bail Hearing

A thorough, extensive review of each case should be required at the bail
hearing in all DV cases. While it is well-recognized that criminal courts are
burdened by a backlog of cases, pretrial release and the conditions therein are
usually decisive of a defendant’s future abuse. 204 In DV cases, the defendant has
“greater access” to the victim than in any other criminal case. 205 If the defendant
is angered by the arrest and loss of control in the relationship, the defendant will
potentially use their access to the victim as an opportunity to avenge the loss of
control. 206 In addition, a defendant should have a right to be heard before their
freedoms are restricted. At the bail hearing, there should be a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant is a continued threat to the victim. If the
defendant is able to prove with clear and convincing evidence that they no longer
pose a threat to the victim, then the defendant should be released only with
conditions common to pretrial release of non-DV cases. 207 If, however, the judge
is not able to make such finding after taking into account the Danger Assessment
and the defendant’s evidence, then the judge shall consider pretrial release
conditions common to DV cases.
4.

Pretrial Release Conditions for Defendants

Using the training she received, the judge should consider what conditions
are necessary to protect the victim. Naturally, only conditions which are
constitutional in the judge’s jurisdiction should be applied. For most
jurisdictions, this means any condition that was applied using case-specific facts
and that serves the state’s interest without violating an explicit right. 208 Factors
shown to increase the risk of DV should be considered, including: economic
stability, emotional dependency, familial relationships, residency, employment,
and prior criminal history. 209 Ideally, these would be detailed in pretrial services’
report.

204. Michael Brigner, Amy’s Law: New Ohio Domestic Violence Bail Statute Adds Safety
Precautions for Crime Victims and the Public, OHIO DOM. REL. J., March/April 2006, at 9.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJ., supra note 39, at 7 (listing common pretrial release
conditions for non-domestic violence cases: not committing a crime, attending court proceedings,
maintaining employment or seeking employment, complying with curfew, not possessing a firearm,
reporting to pretrial services regularly, obtaining “medical, psychological, or psychiatric
treatment”, and remaining in custody of third party).
208. See supra Part IV.B.
209. Bornstein, supra note 48, at 601; PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 3, at 25, 40.
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Conditions such as EM, no-contact orders, restrictions on residency or
employment, and any other prohibition directly related to the DV incident should
be considered. Even if the condition is constitutional, however, the judge should
consider whether the burden on the defendant is completely overshadowed by
the necessity to protect the victim. If, for example, the incidents of DV did not
occur under the influence of drugs and the victim does not report any drug use
on the Danger Assessment, then a condition restricting drug use might be
appropriate, but mandatory drug testing likely would not be useful. Since drug
testing has not been proven to reduce future crime, 210 mandatory drug testing as
a condition of release would not serve the state’s interests in this case—but it
would certainly burden the defendant. Moreover, in a case where the defendant
is not given any restrictions on residency or any other condition prohibiting
movement, placing the defendant under EM likely would be overburdensome
and not serve the state’s interests. EM, because it is so burdensome and
expensive, should be considered a tool to enforce residence restrictions or
movement restrictions rather than a tool to simply advance the state’s interests
on its own.
In an ideal world, the defendant would not pay for conditions placed upon
them, such as payment for the lab to run a drug test or payment to be
electronically monitored. The defendant is already subject to the aforementioned
inadvertent, negative financial effects of some pretrial conditions, so requiring
further payment to comply with those conditions seems borderline
unconstitutional. Obviously, this is not an “ideal world;” resources are limited.
Consequently, conditions that require further payment should be limited to cases
where there is no way to ensure the victim’s safety without them. What
conditions are absolutely necessary to protect the victim would be determined
by the judge with the help of pretrial services’ report.
5.

Support for the Victim

In conjunction with the conditions applied to the defendant, applicable
support should also be given to the victim. The added support and services for a
victim will help a state not only address actual abuse but also the underlying
causes of re-abuse. Added support for the victim should come in two forms:
support tied to the defendant’s conditions and support that requires the state to
provide additional resources to victims. Any condition on the defendant that is
tied to the activity of the victim should allow for the victim to play a role in that
condition. For example, if the defendant is placed on EM, then the victim should
be given the option to receive alerts if the defendant is in a prohibited location. 211
210. See supra Part IV.A.2.
211. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-217(c) (2020) (allowing the victim with a protection order
to be notified if a defendant, who is equipped with EM, is close); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8A-7
(2018) (alerting a victim with a protection order to be notified when the defendant, who is equipped
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If the defendant has a no-contact order with the victim, the victim should be
allowed to waive the no-contact order but have pretrial services present for any
future contact. Furthermore, the state should be required to inform the victim of
all conditions the defendant is required to follow and provide the victim with
resources to help with alternative housing, childcare, and economic stability. 212
Research suggests reducing dependency in abused victims may reduce
continued DV. 213 Though it might require more resources, added support for the
victim creates an added layer of protection for the victim.
6.

Further Review of the Conditions

As suggested in Williams v. State, the conditions set at the first bail hearing
may no longer serve the state’s interests after a while. 214 While defendants are
entitled to ask the court for a bail modification, 215 pretrial services should also
be monitoring relevant facts that led to the initial pretrial release conditions.
Pretrial services should monitor any changes in employment, financial status,
and mental health. Putting the responsibility on a third party like pretrial
services—rather than just the defendant—would give the judge unbiased
information on whether the conditions are still useful. A periodic review would
ensure the defendant, who has yet to be convicted, is not being restricted without
a legitimate state interest.
Being such a new crime, DV is difficult to address. Pretrial release in DV
cases present an even more difficult issue to address: protecting the victim from
future harm while not violating the defendant’s rights. The judges who are
forced to address this issue should be well-educated on the risks and harms of
DV. Though there is limited data on what conditions can prevent those risks,
there is data to identify those risks. States should design a DV-specific statute
that allows a judge to take into account those risks and only apply those
conditions necessary to prevent the risks.
CONCLUSION
DV cases raise unique considerations when assigning pretrial release
conditions. The targeted victim is not random, but rather shares an emotional
connection with the defendant. The defendant and victim often share a home,
children, and several other parts of their life. The arrest can cause a lack of
with EM, has entered prohibited areas); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.6b(6) (2018) (granting the
right of a victim in a domestic violence case to have an additional EM receptor to monitor the
defendant’s location).
212. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-602 (2021) (requiring the state to inform the victim of
alternative housing).
213. Bornstein, supra note 48, at 603.
214. 151 P.3d 460, 471 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
215. See KY. R. CRIM. PROC. R. 4.40 (2020); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 319 (2020); PA.
R. CRIM. PROC. R. 529 (2021).
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economic stability and a disruption in family life. This intermingled relationship
may cause a victim to ask prosecution to drop the charges for fear of retaliation
or may actually cause re-abuse. But to prevent the re-abuse, the court has to
impose burdensome and intrusive conditions on the defendant resulting in a
potential violation of the defendant’s rights. How are states supposed to balance
these competing interests? Is conditional pretrial release really solving any
issues if rates of re-abuse and re-arrest are so high? Are burdensome pretrial
release conditions constitutional?
In part, these questions are difficult to answer because DV is so new to the
criminal justice system. Congress stepped in to help victims only thirty years
ago. 216 Even with the added protections from VAWA, incidents of DV are still
underreported. As a practical matter, more data is necessary to truly know what
is successful.
Another explanation is the sheer variability in DV cases. DV cases affect
family units on a greater scale than non-DV cases. There are endless
considerations when assigning conditions in a DV case that cannot be properly
addressed in a generic bail statute with mandatory conditions for DV defendants.
From a policy standpoint, creating a specialized DV statute is necessary. From
a practical standpoint, creating a specialized DV statute with no judicial
discretion is not only impracticable, but ineffective.
Accordingly, states should implement specialized DV statutes that allow a
judge to consider each case individually but provide parameters of how and
when judges should assign pretrial release conditions in DV cases. After
receiving specialized training, the judge should review a risk assessment for each
defendant before the bail hearing and assign conditions accordingly. Conditions
should be tailored to each case to address the risk factors present in that case.
Moreover, once conditions are set, a risk assessment review should happen
periodically throughout the pretrial phase to ensure the conditions are not only
still serving the state’s interests but also have not infringed on the defendant’s
rights. With these modifications, states could successfully balance the
competing interests in pretrial release in a DV case.
JACQUELYN SICILIA *

216. See generally VAWA, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 42 U.S. §§ 13925–14045d (1994) (granting
added protections and resources to women affected by violence).
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Saint Louis University School of Law. Special thank you to Professor Chad
Flanders for his guidance on this Note.
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APPENDIX I
Mandatory Conditions
Temporary
Hold

Alabama

Alaska

Restriction on
Residence or
Employment

No-Contact
Order

Discretionary
Conditions
Enrollment
in
Counseling
or
Treatment
Ala. Code
§ 15-30190(b) (2019)

Ala. Code
§ 15-30190(a)
(2019)

ALASKA
STAT.
§ 12.30.011
(2020)

ALASKA
STAT.
§ 12.30.027(b)
(2020)

Arizona

ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3601
(2021)

Arkansas

ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-81113(e) (2020)

California

Cal. Penal
Code
§ 1270 (West
2021)

Colorado

COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-11001 (2020)

COLO. REV.
STAT. § 181-1001(3)(b)
(2020)

Connecticut

CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 5463c (2021)

Delaware

DEL. C.P.R.
5.2

Florida

FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 14

Georgia

GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-61(f)(2)
(2020)

GA. CODE
ANN. § 176-1(f)(2)
(2020)

GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-6-1
(2020)

Hawaii

HAW. REV.
STAT. § 8047.4 (2017)

Idaho

IDAHO C.P.R.
46
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IND. CODE
§ 35-33-83.6 (2021)

IND. CODE
§ 35-33-86.5 (2021)

IND. CODE
§ 35-33-8-3.2
(2021)
IOWA CODE
§ 811.2 (2021)

Iowa
KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 222802 (2021)

Kansas

Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 222802 (2021)
KY. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 403.740
(West 2021);
Id. § 431.520
(West 2021)

Kentucky

Louisiana

Discretionary
Conditions
725 ILL.
COMP. STAT.
5/110-5
(2018)

Illinois

Indiana

[Vol. 66:601

LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art.
320(G)
(2020)

LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art.
320(G) (2020)

LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art.
320(G)
(2020)

LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art.
320(G) (2020)

Maine

ME. STAT. tit.
15, § 1026
(2021)

Maryland

MD. C.P.R. 4216.1

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch.
276, § 56
(2020)

Michigan

MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.
§ 765.6b
(2018)

Minnesota

MINN. C.P.R.
6.02

Mississippi

Missouri

MISS. CODE.
ANN. § 99-537(2) (2021)

MISS. CODE.
ANN. § 99-537(2) (2021)
MO. REV.
STAT.
§ 544.457
(2020)
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Discretionary
Conditions

Montana

Mont. Code
Ann.
46-6-602
(2021); 217 id.
§ 46-9-108
(2021)

Nebraska

Neb. Rev.
Stat.
§ 29-901.01
(2020)

Nevada

NEV. REV.
STAT.
§ 178.484
(2020)

New
Hampshire

N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 173-B:1
(2018)

New Jersey

N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:2526(d) (2013)

New Mexico

N.M. Ct.
C.P.R. 5-401
(amended by
New Mexico
Court Order
0028)

New York

N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law
§ 530.12
(McKinney
2020)

North
Carolina

N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A534.1 (2020)

North Dakota

N.D. C.P.R.
46; N.D.
CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-19
(2019)

217. As a disclaimer, this statute includes a provision requiring the state to inform a victim of
domestic violence of another place to live. The condition of requiring the state to inform a victim
of DV of another place to live is a mandatory condition, but it does not fit under the categories for
mandatory conditions in this Appendix.
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Okla. Stat. tit.
22, § 60.16
(2016)

OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22,
§ 60.16
(2016)
OR. REV.
STAT.
§ 135.247
(2019)

Oregon

12 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 1229-4 (2020)

Rhode Island

S.D.
CODIFIED
LAWS § 2510-23 (2020)

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 2510-3.1 (2020)
TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-11150 (2020);
id. § 40-11116 (2020)

TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4011-150(h)(1)
(2020)

TEX. C.P.R.,
art. 17.40

Texas

Vermont

12 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 1229-4 (2020)
S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-25120 (2020); id.
§ 17-15-10
(2020)

South
Carolina

Utah

OR. REV.
STAT.
§ 135.250(2)
(2019); id.
§ 135.260
(2019)
18 Pa. Stat.
and Cons.
Stat. Ann.
§ 2711(c)
(West 2018)

18 Pa. Stat.
and Cons.
Stat. Ann.
§ 2711(c)
(West 2018)

Pennsylvania

Tennessee

Discretionary
Conditions
OHIO C.P.R.
46; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.
§ 2937.33
(LexisNexis
2020)

Ohio

Oklahoma
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UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B7-802
(LexisNexis
2020)

Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-7802
(LexisNexis
2020)
VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7554 (2021)
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Discretionary
Conditions

Virginia

VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2120 (2020)

Washington

WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.99
(2021)
W. VA. CODE
§ 6-2-1C-17c
(2020)

West Virginia

Wisconsin
Wyoming

WIS. STAT.
§ 968.075(5)
(b)(1) (2021)

W. VA.
CODE § 6-21C-17c
(2020)

W. VA. CODE
§ 6-2-1C-17c
(2020)
WIS. STAT.
§ 968.075
(2021)
WYO. C.P.R.
46.1
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APPENDIX II
Proposed Model Law on Pretrial Release in Domestic Violence Cases:
§ 1.1 In an arrest involving domestic violence, the defendant should be held for
up to seventy-two hours after arrest. During the seventy-two hours, pretrial
services should conduct a thorough investigation of the case to provide the judge
with a risk assessment on the defendant.
(a) Pretrial services should collect the following data:
(i) a danger assessment tool filled out by the victim; and
(ii) any other data that is related to an increased risk level of re-abuse.
§ 1.2 Prior to the expiration of the seventy-two hours, pretrial services should
inform the victim of his or her resources which shall include, but not be limited
to: alternative housing, counseling services, support centers, and the contact
information of law enforcement.
§ 1.3 The victim and defendant are prohibited from any form of contact during
the temporary hold, unless there is an emergency situation. If an emergency
situation arises, a pretrial services officer, or other unbiased third party, shall be
present for the emergency contact.
§ 1.4 After reviewing the risk assessment, the defendant should appear before
the judge at a bail hearing. The defendant has the burden of proof to show he or
she is no longer a threat to the victim. If the judge finds the defendant is able to
prove through clear and convincing evidence that he or she no longer poses a
threat to the victim, then the defendant should be released only with conditions
common to pretrial release in non-DV cases.
§ 1.5 If the judge finds the defendant is a continued threat, she should consider
whether any condition or combination of conditions would protect the victim
and the community but ensure reappearance by the defendant. Possible
conditions may include:
(a) GPS monitoring with the victim having the right to request transmission
of the GPS location;
(b) No aiding in the commission of a crime or committing a crime;
(c) No attempting to threaten or persuade the victim in any way regarding
matters of the case;
(d) Refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon;
(e) Refrain from excessive use of alcohol and any use of a narcotic drug or
other controlled substance;
(f) Maintain employment or actively seek employment;
(g) Report up-to-date contact information to pretrial officer;
(h) Remain in custody of a third party who agrees to supervise and report
any condition violations;
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(i) Prohibition of returning to a shared residence with the victim;
(j) No-contact order;
(k) No-contact without a pretrial service officer supervising; and
(l) Any other prohibition that was directly related to the domestic violence
incident.
§ 1.6 If a condition or combination of conditions is sufficient to protect the
victim and community and support reappearance, the defendant shall be released
on those conditions. If there is no condition or combination of conditions to
protect the victim and community from further harm and/or support
reappearance, the defendant should be held in pretrial detention.
§ 1.7 If released subject to conditions in § 1.5, the defendant’s risk assessment
should be revaluated quarterly during the pretrial phase. The defendant also has
the right to seek a modification of those conditions.
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